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Unconditionally Secure Quantum Bit Commitment Using
Neutron Double-Slit Interference
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Using a neutron double-slit setup, we construct a quantum bit commitment scheme in which time
development of quantum states plays an essential role. Our scheme evades the widely accepted
no-go theorem by the fact that it is neither possible to stop the time evolution of spreading wave
packets, nor is it possible to evolve them backward in time. Moreover, for unstable particles such as
neutrons, one cannot delay detecting their positions indefinitely, or they would disintegrate sponta-
neously and escape detection. We find that using non-stationary states instead of stationary ones,
unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is possible.
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Quantum cryptography is one of the most success-
ful branches of quantum information science. The
well known BB84 quantum key distribution proto-
col was proposed early in 1984 [1], and to date it has
been implemented in the real world over distances
as large as hundreds of kilometers [2]. Besides quan-
tum key distribution there are also many other in-
teresting cryptographic protocols among which the
primitive quantum bit commitment occupies a spe-
cial position. The security of quantum bit commit-
ment (QBC) is an important issue because secure
QBC can be used as an building block for other
more complicated cryptographic protocols [3] such
as quantum coin tossing [4] and quantum oblivious
transfer [5–8]. Furthermore it is known that, at least
in classical models, oblivious transfer can be used to
implement secure two-party computation [9, 10]. So
it seems that the security of QBC also holds the key
to this long standing problem in cryptography as
well.
Bit commitment involves two distrusting parties
customarily named Alice and Bob. In the beginning
Alice commits to Bob a secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} that is
to be revealed at some later time. In order to en-
sure Bob that she will keep her commitment, Alice
provides Bob with a piece of evidence with which he
can verify her honesty when she finally unveils the
committed bit. A bit commitment protocol is secure
if it satisfies the following two conditions. (1) Con-
cealing: Bob gets no information about the value of
b before Alice unveils it; (2) Binding: Alice cannot
change b without Bob’s knowledge. (In general both
conditions are satisfied only asymptotically as some
security parameter N becomes large.) Furthermore,
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if the protocol remains secure even if Alice and Bob
had capabilities limited only by the laws of nature
(this is sometimes referred to as the parties having
unlimited computational power), then it is said to
be unconditionally secure.
Consider a simple classical example. Alice writes
down her committed bit b on a piece of paper and
locks it in a box. She gives the box to Bob as evi-
dence of her commitment but keeps the key to her-
self. Alice unveils by announcing the value of b and
giving the key to Bob for verification. This proto-
col seems secure because Alice cannot change the
bit value without access to the box, and Bob cannot
open the box without the key. However, as with all
other classical cryptographic schemes, it is not un-
conditionally secure because, e.g., Bob’s ability to
open the box by himself cannot be ruled out as a
matter of principle. By introducing quantum me-
chanics into bit commitment, one hopes to achieve
unconditional security which is guaranteed by the
laws of nature.
In a QBC protocol, Alice and Bob execute a series
of quantum and classical operations during the com-
mitment procedure, which finally results in a quan-
tum state ρ
(b)
B in Bob’s hand. If
ρ
(0)
B = ρ
(1)
B , (1)
then the protocol is perfectly concealing, and Bob is
not able to extract any information about the value
of b from ρ
(b)
B . When Alice reveals the value of b,
she must also provide additional information which,
together with ρ
(b)
B , will allow Bob to check if she is
honest.
For some time a QBC protocol [11] proposed in
1993 was widely believed to be unconditionally se-
cure, but it was eventually shown otherwise [12].
Moreover, a “no-go theorem” was put forth in 1997
2[13, 14], which supposedly proved that concealing
protocols can always be cheated by Alice, conse-
quently unconditionally secure QBC is ruled out as a
matter of principle. Due to the importance of QBC,
this result, if true, constitutes a major setback for
quantum cryptography.
Before proceeding further, it is instructive to out-
line the impossibility proof for the perfectly conceal-
ing case [13, 14]. The proof is based on the assump-
tion that, by quantum entanglement, Alice and Bob
can keep all undisclosed classical information unde-
termined and stored them at the quantum level. In
other words, they can delay all prescribed measure-
ments without consequences until it is required to
disclose the outcomes. It then follows that at the
end of the commitment phase, there always exists a
pure state |Ψ
(b)
AB〉 in the joint Hilbert space HA⊗HB
of Alice and Bob. |Ψ
(b)
AB〉 is called a quantum purifi-
cation of the evidence state ρ
(b)
B , such that
TrA |Ψ
(b)
AB〉〈Ψ
(b)
AB | = ρ
(b)
B , (2)
where the trace is over Alice’s share of the state.
Note that whether Bob purifies or not is irrelevant
to Alice, and she could simply assume he does. In
general purification requires access to quantum com-
puters, which is consistent with the assumption that
Alice and Bob have unlimited computational power.
Since the protocol is assumed to be perfectly con-
cealing, therefore Eq. (1) holds. Then, according
to a theorem by Hughston et al. [18], the two pu-
rifications |Ψ
(0)
AB〉 and |Ψ
(1)
AB〉 are related by a local
unitary transformation UA on Alice’s side, namely,
|Ψ
(1)
AB〉 = UA|Ψ
(0)
AB〉. (3)
Since UA acts on HA only, she can implement it
without Bob’s help. Then it is obvious that Alice
can change her commitment at will, and Bob will
always conclude that she is honest because his den-
sity matrix ρ
(b)
B is not affected by UA. So it seems
that no QBC protocols could be simultaneously con-
cealing and binding [13, 14].
It has been shown that, if we do not adhere to
the standard cryptographic scenario and allow Alice
and Bob to control two separated sites each, then
an unconditionally secure classical bit commitment
protocol can be constructed using relativistic effects
[15]. Nevertheless, in this paper, we are interested
only in non-relativistic quantum bit commitment in
the standard scenario where each party controls only
one site.
Since 1997, there have been many attempts at
breaking the no-go theorem [16], however a math-
ematically rigorous result is still lacking so far.
Conceptually, the claim that unconditionally secure
QBC is ruled out in principle is rather puzzling to
some. First of all, while the objective of QBC is well
defined, the corresponding procedure is not precisely
specified. That is, there exists no general mathe-
matical characterization of all imaginable QBC pro-
tocols [17]. So it is unlikely that the no-go theorem
could have blocked all possible routes to uncondi-
tionally secure QBC. Secondly, when something in
nature is forbidden, there usually exists a deeper and
more general reason or principle behind it. Thus, for
example, electric charge can neither be created nor
destroyed because electromagnetic interactions obey
an exact U(1) gauge symmetry; arbitrary quantum
states cannot be perfectly cloned because informa-
tion cannot be transmitted faster than the speed of
light; etc. However unconditionally secure QBC is
not known to violate any laws in physics or informa-
tion theory, so why should it be strictly ruled out?
As we saw above, the no-go theorem considers
only stationary states which do not have significant
time evolution properties. However a complete im-
possibility proof should take into account the ef-
fect of time evolution of quantum states in general.
Therefore if a protocol uses non-stationary states
to carry quantum information, then it is not cov-
ered by the no-go theorem. In the following discus-
sion, instead of stationary states, we shall use parti-
cles whose spatial wavefunctions are spreading wave
packets (their spins are irrelevant). Moreover they
are unstable particles with finite lifetimes.
Consider the following example. Alice and Bob
shares a pure maximally entangled state of two par-
ticles |ψAB(~x, t)〉, where (~x, t) refer to particle-A,
and the degrees of freedom of particle-B are not
explicitly shown. Particle-A’s spatial wavefunction
involves spreading wave packets of macroscopic di-
mension while its spin is irrelevant. It is well known
that the wavefunction at t = t0 and t = t1 (t1 > t0)
are related by a unitary time evolution operator
U(t1, t0), namely,
|ψAB(~x, t1)〉 = U(t1, t0)|ψAB(~x, t0)〉, (4)
where
U(t1, t0) = e
−iHA(t1−t0), (5)
HA = p
2/2mA is the free-particle Hamiltonian op-
erator of particle-A, and we have assumed HB = 0
for simplicity. Suppose to commit to b = 0, Alice is
required to determine particle-A’s position at t = t0,
and for b = 1 she must do so at time t = t1 (t1 > t0).
Clearly the wavefunctions involved are not station-
ary, and schemes of this type are therefore not ruled
out by the no-go theorem. We show below that in-
deed the impossibility proof does not go through.
To proceed, let us follow the cheating strategy
suggested by the no-go theorem: For b = 0, Alice
3measures the particle position coherently at t = t0
with unitary operation and ancilla (suppose it is
possible). The resulting pure state can be written
schematically as
|Ψ
(0)
AB(~x, t0)〉 =M [ |Φ〉|ψAB(~x, t0)〉], (6)
where |Φ〉 is the ancilla state, and M is a local uni-
tary operator which entangles |Φ〉 with |ψAB(~x, t0)〉.
If necessary the outcome of the measurement can be
obtained by a projective measurement on the ancilla
state. Likewise if she commits to b = 1,
|Ψ
(1)
AB(~x, t1)〉 =M [ |Φ〉|ψAB(~x, t1)〉]. (7)
So mathematically, just as the no-go theorem says,
there does exist a local unitary transformation UA
connecting |Ψ
(0)
AB(~x, t0)〉 and |Ψ
(1)
AB(~x, t1)〉, with
UA =M U(t1, t0)M
†. (8)
But it is also clear that Alice cannot naively use this
UA to cheat, because |Ψ
(0)
AB(~x, t0)〉 and |Ψ
(1)
AB(~x, t1)〉
are not stationary states. Consequently, by the time
Alice unveils at t = T , |Ψ
(0)
AB(~x, t0)〉 would have
evolved to
|Ψ˜
(0)
AB(~x, T )〉 = U(T, t0)|Ψ
(0)
AB(~x, t0)〉, (9)
where we have assumed HΦ = 0 for simplicity.
Therefore, in order to succeed, Alice must either (i)
Artificially evolve |Ψ˜
(0)
AB(~x, T )〉 back to t = t0 when
she unveils, or (ii) Freeze |Ψ
(0)
AB(~x, t0)〉 at t = t0 when
she commits. But such manipulations are clearly
not possible even with a quantum computer. Fur-
thermore, even if they were possible, if particle-A is
unstable with a lifetime τ ≤ T , then it is not possible
for Alice to keep its position undetected until t = T ,
because there is a finite probability (1− e−T/τ ) that
by then there is no particle to detect.
With this observations, we present below a QBC
protocol which is unconditionally secure. We shall
formulate it explicitly using neutrons which decay
spontaneously into a proton(p), an electron(e), and
an anti-neutrino(ν¯), n → p + e + ν¯, with a mean
lifetime of τ = 885.7 seconds[19]. Nevertheless any
unstable particles with a suitable lifetime will do.
The required experimental setup is a double-slit ap-
paratus similar to that used to demonstrate the wave
nature of neutrons [20]. So this protocol is realizable
with available technologies.
Commit:
1. At time t = 0, Bob generates a neutron with
momentum p (its spin is irrelevant) and sends
it into a double-slit apparatus. With proba-
bility 1/2, he randomly closes one of the slits
before the neutron arrives. A detector screen is
placed at a distance L from the slits on the exit
side of the apparatus. If uninterrupted, the
neutron enters the slits at t = t0, and reaches
the screen at t = t1. We assume that t1 << τ ,
so that the possibility of neutron decay before
t = t1 is negligible.
2. To commit to b = 0, Alice must find out which
slit does the neutron go through. For b = 1,
she must detect it on the screen and records
its position. At t = t1, Alice must announce
whether a neutron has been detected or not
(the neutron makes it through the slits with a
finite probability α).
3. The above procedure is repeated N times. Or,
to save time, the whole commitment process
can be carried out in parallel with N identical
double-slit setups. The latter case is assumed
for simplicity, and the commitment phase ends
at t = τ .
Unveil:
1. At time t = T , Alice unveils the value of b
and the corresponding neutron detection data.
Specifically, for b = 0, she must specify the slit
from which each of the αN neutrons emerged;
for b = 1, she must reveal the position at which
each of these neutrons was detected on the
screen.
2. Bob checks if Alice’s data are consistent with
her commitment.
Having specified the protocol, we proceed to show
that it is unconditionally secure. First of all, this
protocol is obviously concealing, since the only in-
formation disclosed by Alice during the commitment
procedure is if neutrons have been detected. Next
we show that it is binding. Let us first consider clas-
sical cheating. If Alice had determined the which-slit
information at t = t0, then she would not be able to
distinguish the single-slit and double-slit events, and
consistent reconstruction of the interference pattern
on the screen would be impossible. On the other
hand, if she had detected the neutrons on the screen
at t = t1, the resulting pattern is a superposition of
single-slit and double-slit events, and it is impossi-
ble to separate the two because they occur randomly.
Hence Alice could not commit to one bit value and
unveil another. If she did, she could only do so by
pure guessing, but then her success probability is
only of order 2−αN .
Next we consider the quantum cheating strategy
suggested by the no-go theorem. As shown in Eq.
(8), in accordance with the theorem, there is indeed
4a unitary transformation UA connecting the wave-
functions corresponding to the b = 0 and b = 1
cases, which is essentially just the usual time evo-
lution operator. However, as explained before, this
strategy would work only if (i) Alice could freeze the
neutron wavefunctions at t = t0, or (ii) she could
evolve the wavefunctions from t = T backward to
t = t0. Both strategies are obviously impossible.
Moreover, even if they were possible, there are only
N(T ) = αNe−T/τ ≤ αNe−1 neutrons left at t = T
to be manipulated, as a finite fraction of them have
already disintegrated. Consequently Alice must hon-
estly detect the neutrons at t = t0 or t = t1, other-
wise the neutron wavefunctions would evolve (spread
and disintegrate) according to the laws of nature,
which she cannot stop. Hence this protocol is bind-
ing as well as concealing. This completes the proof
that our protocol is unconditionally secure.
From the above discussion, we see that time evo-
lution of non-stationary quantum states plays an es-
sential role in our protocol. In contrast, the time fac-
tor is not considered in the no-go theorem [13, 14],
where the wavefunctions involved are assumed to be
stationary. In our protocol, neutron wavefunctions
are non-stationary in two senses: (i) The neutron
spatial wavefunctions expand in size, and (ii) Neu-
trons are unstable with a mean lifetime of about 15
minutes [19]. These features are crucial to the se-
curity of our protocol. We emphasize that formally
there does exist a unitary transformation UA con-
necting the b = 0 and b = 1 states, so the no-go
theorem is mathematically correct. But Alice can-
not use this UA to cheat because, by the time she
unveils, the quantum state has evolved to something
beyond her control.
In summary, using wave packets of unstable parti-
cles instead of stationary states, we have constructed
a new QBC protocol and shown that it is uncon-
ditionally secure. Our protocol is basically a neu-
tron double-slit experiment, similar to that used to
demonstrate the wave nature of neutrons [20]. The
security of this protocol is due to the facts that it
is neither possible to stop the spreading of a wave
packet, nor is it possible to evolve it backward in
time. Moreover neutrons are unstable, so that detec-
tion of their positions cannot be indefinitely delay,
or they will disintegrate spontaneously and eventu-
ally there will be no neutrons left to be detected.
Our result shows that if non-stationary time evolu-
tion of quantum states is taken into account, then
the widely accepted no-go theorem we can evaded,
and unconditionally secure QBC is possible.
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